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Questionnaire 
for the XIVth Congress of the Conference of European 
Constitutional Courts 
 
“Problems of Legislative Omission in Constitutional 
Jurisprudence” 
 
Response of Malta 
 
 
The concepts of “legal gap” and “legislative omission”, as defined for the 
purposes of the questionnaire, are not known as such in Maltese 
constitutional law or indeed in the Maltese legal system. It has therefore 
not been possible to relate most of the questions in the questionnaire to 
the situation obtaining in Malta. However, there have been several 
instances where the Constitutional Court of Malta, acting as the highest 
court charged with, among other things, ensuring the protection of the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, has ruled that the law 
was “inadequate”, with the result that either the law or practice had to be 
changed. 
 
The Constitutional Court of Malta was established with the coming into 
force of the 1964 Constitution. The Constitution is the supreme law of the 
land and, besides setting up and regulating major institutions – such as 
Parliament, the Executive, the Judiciary, the Consolidated Fund, the 
Auditor General, the Public Service Commission, the Broadcasting 
Authority, the Employment Commission – it contains a chapter (Chapter 
II) dealing with “Declaration of Principles” and another chapter (Chapter 
IV) dealing with “Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Individual”. 
Although the principles1 contained in Chapter II are “not enforceable in 
any court”, article 21 of the Constitution provides that “[these] 
principles…are nevertheless fundamental to the governance of the country 
and it shall be the aim of the state to apply these principles in making 
laws”. It has often been argued in academic circles in Malta that these 
principles could be resorted to by a court for purposes of interpretation of 
existing provisions of the law, including instances where interpretation is 
necessary in view of a lacuna in the law which can be addressed by 
interpreting other provisions of the same law to render a coherent whole 
in line with the maxim interpretare et concondare leges legibus est optimus 
interpretandi modus.  
 
                                                           
1
 These fourteen principles deal with the Right to Work, Promotion of Culture and Scientific and 
Technical Research, Safeguarding the Landscape and the Historical and Artistic Patrimony, 
Compulsory and Free Primary Education, Educational Interests, Protection of Work, Hours of Work, 
Equal Rights of Men and Women, Minimum Age for Paid Labour, Safeguarding the Labour of Minors, 
Social Assistance and Insurance, Encouragement of Private Economic Enterprise, Protection of Artisan 
Trades and Encouragement of Co-operatives. 
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The Fundamental Rights and Freedoms contained in Chapter IV, on the 
other hand, are directly enforceable by the courts – by the First Hall of the 
Civil Court in first instance and, upon appeal, by the Constitutional Court. 
Since the enactment of the European Convention Act 2 in 1987, these two 
courts are also responsible for the enforcement of the substantive 
provisions of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, including provisions of the First, Fourth, 
Sixth and Seventh Protocols to the said Convention. 
 
A case for securing the protection of any one or more of these fundamental 
rights and freedoms may be brought before the First Hall of the Civil 
Court in one of two ways: either by way of a direct application to that 
court by any interested party, or by way of a reference made to it by any 
other court. Article 46(3) of the Constitution (and the corresponding article 
4(3) of Chapter 319) provides that if in any proceedings in any court (other 
than the First Hall of the Civil Court or the Constitutional Court) any 
question arises as to the contravention of any of the provisions of Chapter 
IV of the Constitution or of any of the substantive provisions of the 
European Convention and its Protocols, “that court shall refer the 
question to the Civil Court, First Hall, unless in its opinion the raising of 
the question is merely frivolous or vexatious; and that court shall give its 
decision on any question referred to it under this sub-article and…the 
court in which the question arose shall dispose of the question in 
accordance with that decision”. In enforcing these fundamental rights 
provisions, the First Hall of the Civil Court and, on appeal, the 
Constitutional Court, “may make such orders, issue such writs and give 
such directions as [they] may consider appropriate for the purpose of 
enforcing, or securing the enforcement of, any [of these provisions] to the 
protection of which the person concerned is entitled…”3. This provision 
gives a very wide latitude to the First Hall of the Civil Court and to the 
Constitutional Court as to the type of “remedies” it can give when finding 
that a human rights provision has been, is being, or is likely to be 
breached.  
 
A typical case of an “inadequate” law which did not measure up to the 
requirements of the human rights provisions is provided by Victoria 
Cassar v. Malta Maritime Authority et, which was finally decided by the 
Constitutional Court on the 2 November 2001. Under part of the Port 
Workers Regulations then obtaining, when a port worker retired, his son, 
or his eldest son if he had more that one son or, in the absence of sons, his 
brother or his eldest brother, were eligible to be registered to fill the 
vacancy left by him. Cassar was the eldest of the children of a retired port 
worker, but the Port Worker’s Board refused to register her as a port 
worker since eligibility to fill the vacancy was limited to sons and brothers 
thereby excluding daughters. It was argued before the First Hall of the 
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 Chapter 319 of the Laws of Malta. 
3
 Article 46(2) of the Constitution and Article 4(2) of Chapter 319. 
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Civil Court that this discrimination was objectively justifiable in view of 
the nature of work in the port area – its hazardous and strenuous nature. 
The Constitutional Court, confirming the judgment of the First Hall of the 
Civil Court, found that the provision of the Port Workers Regulations 
which excluded a priori the daughters of retired port workers from filling 
the vacancy left by their father was in breach of both the Constitution 
(article 45 – protection of discrimination on the grounds of, among others, 
sex) as well as of article 14 of the European Convention read in 
conjunction with article 3 (degrading treatment). The court declared the 
provisions of the said regulations, in so far as they discriminated on the 
basis of sex, to be null and void, and further ordered the Port Workers 
Board to register Victoria Cassar as a port worker with retroactive effect 
(that is from the date she would have been so eligible to be registered had 
she been a son or a brother). In coming to this conclusion the 
Constitutional Court referred to, among others, the European Social 
Charter and to Equal Rights Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States. 
 
By an earlier judgment – Paul Stoner et v. The Prime Minister et, 22 
February 1996 – the Constitutional Court also held that a provision of the 
Constitution, indeed a Human Rights provision – article 44 – was itself in 
breach of article 45. Article 44 provides for the protection of freedom of 
movement of citizens of Malta, and sub-article (4) thereof provides for 
who, not being a citizen of Malta, is nonetheless to be deemed to be a 
citizen of Malta for the purposes of the said article 44. Paul Stoner was an 
Englishman and his wife, Evelyn, was Maltese. Article 44(4)(c) of the 
Constitution then provided that the foreign wife of a Maltese citizen 
enjoyed freedom of movement in Malta, but the same was not available to 
the foreign husband of a Maltese citizen. By way of a remedy the 
Constitutional Court ordered that that Paul Stoner was to be considered 
for the purposes of article 44 as being entitled to the same freedom of 
movement as his wife; and the respondents, that is the Prime Minister, 
the Commissioner of Police and the Principal Immigration Officer, were 
ordered to conform accordingly. Paragraph (c) of sub-article (4) of article 
44 of the Constitution was eventually amended in 2001. 
 
Findings of unjustified discrimination have not been limited to grounds of 
sex. In a judgment delivered by the First Hall of the Civil Court on the 17 
January 1997 in the names Mario Buttigieg proprio et nomine v. The 
Attorney General et, several provisions in the Civil Code which 
discriminated between legitimate and illegitimate children in respect of 
rights of inheritance were deemed to be null and void. The court found the 
said provisions to be in violation of article 14 of the European Convention 
when read in conjunction with article 8 of the same Convention. No appeal 
was lodged by the Government with the Constitutional Court.  
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In a more recent case – The Police v. Joseph Lebrun 4  – the Constitutional 
Court imposed a time limit within which Parliament could amend the law. 
The case arose out of committal proceedings before the Court of 
Magistrates as a Court of Criminal Inquiry. Lebrun was charged with the 
offences of conspiracy to import, importation, trafficking and possession of 
heroin. At the end of the committal proceedings before the Court of 
Criminal Inquiry, that court ruled that there was not enough prima facie 
evidence for an indictment to be filed before the Criminal Court and 
therefore discharged (not acquitted) Lebrun, and sent the record of the 
case to the Attorney General. The Attorney General was of a different 
opinion and decided to contest the court’s decision. As the law then stood 5, 
the A.G. sought, in private, the concurrence of a judge of the superior 
courts, not being a judge ordinarily sitting in the Criminal Court or in the 
Court of Criminal Appeal, and having obtained such concurrence ordered 
the re-arrest of Lebrun and ordered the continuation of the committal 
proceedings. Lebrun alleged that this procedure infringed his right to a 
fair hearing in violation of Article 39(1) of the Constitution and Article 
6(1) of the European Convention. The Court of Criminal Inquiry referred 
the question to the First Hall of the Civil Court. The First Hall of the Civil 
Court dismissed the allegation on the ground that the administrative or 
quasi-judicial procedure whereby the A.G. consulted in private with a 
judge was not determinative of guilt or innocence; it would be the 
proceedings before the Criminal Court (in a trail by jury) which would 
eventually determine such guilt or innocence. Lebrun appealed to the 
Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court, overturning the decision 
of the court of first instance, held that when the Court of Criminal Inquiry 
decides that there are not sufficient grounds for an indictment to be filed, 
that decision was in effect “decisive for the determination of the criminal 
charge” in so far as the case against the accused could not proceed further 
on that record and on that evidence. The procedure whereby the A.G. 
consulted in private a judge of his own choosing (other than a judge 
ordinarily sitting in the Criminal Court or in the Court of Criminal 
Appeal) and, with his consent, ordered the continuation of proceedings 
against the accused (either by filing straight away a bill of indictment in 
the Criminal Court or, as was done in this case, ordering the committal 
proceedings to continue), was in effect a form of “appeal” which reversed 
the judicial decision that there were not sufficient grounds for an 
indictment to be filed. This “appeal” stage, therefore, had also to abide by 
the minimum requirements of a fair hearing (as was the case with the 
committal stage). The Constitutional Court, therefore, held that the 
procedure adopted by the A.G. in conformity with article 433(3) of the 
Criminal Code was in breach of article 39(1) of the Constitution and 
article 6(1) of the European Convention; it ordered a three-month stay of 
the proceedings which had recommenced before the Court of Criminal 
Inquiry; and ordered that unless within such time a new procedure, 
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 Decided by the First Hall of the Civil Court on the 27 June 2006; decided by the Constitutional Court 
on the 9 February 2007. 
5
 Article 433(3) of the Criminal Code. 
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conforming to the requirements of articles 39(1) and 6(1), came into effect, 
and was applied with respect to the proceedings against Lebrun, for the 
revision and possible variation of the original decision that there was not 
enough prima facie evidence for an indictment to be filed, then that 
original decision was to prevail. 
 
Before the expiry of the three month period, Parliament amended sub-
article (3) of article 433 of the Criminal Code, introducing a form of appeal 
to the Criminal Court in which the person accused would have the right to 
make submissions. Upon such an appeal, the Criminal Court held that 
there were sufficient grounds for an indictment to be filed against Lebrun 
and therefore the A.G. was allowed to continue with the case on the same 
record and evidence. 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
  
